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Abstract
DOYLE, WILLIAM J., III Classifying System Call Traces using Anomalous Detection. Department of
Computer Science, June 2015.
ADVISOR: Cass, Aaron
We used data mining techniques to detect intrusions among system call traces and have outlined our
results. Recent work at the intersection of security and machine learning has lead to better understanding
of anomalous intrusion detection. There is a need to more thoroughly understand how anomaly detection
can be used because of its potential applications and advantages over current standard methods. In this
thesis, we report on a new approach of anomalous detection using system call traces. Our goal is to be able
to create a system that can accurately detect hacking attacks by analyzing the sequences of system calls the
operating system is performing. We will look at how this data can be processed to achieve correct detection
of intrusions on a system. In the end, we will outline ways in which system call traces can be leveraged as
well as what we can do and learn from these results.
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1 Introduction
Computer security becomes ever more important as we build more advanced computer systems. Vulner-
abilities in a computer system are starting to become more easily exploited as the types of attacks evolve
over time. To this end, research is turning towards understanding trends within system data to be able to
detect intrusions quicker and more efficiently. [10]
Consider a scenario where someone is inside of a cafe on an open network. Unknowing to them they
have become the victim of an attacker who plans to perform malicious actions on the machine. Being able
to detect these types of intrusions before the attacker performs their malicious actions is critical to the safety
of the data in a modern computing world. One way we can go about doing this is to “look” for specific
parts of the attack happening. Perhaps, in the cafe network example, the attacker uses the file system in
a way that is different from the way a typical user would. We can use this piece of information to create
a detection system that will look for these types of anomalies on the computer. Some examples of these
anomalies are unusual read/write behavior, multiple attempts to log-in to the machine, or being on an
unsecured connection.
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) [1] have been shown to be an effective means of pro-
tection on modern systems. Such systems are able to detect intrusions on an individual host by analyzing
the information that is available on the machine (e.g. system calls, network traffic, etc.). Two common ways
of implementing a host-based intrusion detection system are using a signature-based [17] or an anomaly-
based [18] approach. A signature-based system will attempt to match current behaviors occurring on the
system against a known database of intrusion-type behavior. In this method, what the specific attacks “look
like” are known before the intrusion occurs.
On the other hand, an anomaly-based system has a constructed model of normal behavior. The detection
system indicates an attack when the observed behavior statistically deviates from the modeled normal
behavior. Signature-based approaches tend to have higher detection rates but they perform poorly when
introduced to a new attack unknown to the detection system. For this reason, intrusion detection research
is turning towards understanding anomaly-based systems. [11] [1]
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Within Section 2 and will outline previous work that has
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Method Accuracy FPR Authors
kNN 50% 50% Miao Xie et al.
kMC 60% 20% Miao Xie et al.
SVM sequences 70% 20% Miao Xie et al.
SVM dictionary 80% 15% Gideon Creech et al.
ELM 90% 15% Gideon Creech et al.
Genetic Alg. 95% 30% M. Hoque et al.
Table 1: Accuracy and False Positive Rates
been done on the problem of anomaly detection with system calls as well as some other approaches. In
Section 3 will begin to discuss our methods and what we hope to accomplish as well as an overview of the
ADFA-LD, the dataset we used during our experiments. Section 4 will describe our experiment setup and
results. Finally, we will draw conclusions from these results and describe what we hope can be done next.
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Previous Work
Before we begin to discuss some of the work done by others in the field we explain some of the key terms
involved in the discussion. A system call is a fundamental interface between a program on a machine and
the operating system. The system call is a way for a user program to request an operation to be completed
by the operating system. For example, a program may want to open a file and then copy it to a new
directory. These tasks can be accomplished by using some sequence of system calls. As a result, programs
running on the machine will produce sequences of system call, also known as system call traces. In later
sections we will go into more detail about system calls and system call traces for now we can think of them
in this fundamental way.
There are a few algorithms used within this section that we outline here:
kNN The k nearest neighbor (kNN) algorithm will classify data based on a distance metric. After a new
data point is given to the model it will calculate how close in distance it is to other data points that
already have been classified. How large of a distance area the algorithm looks at depends upon the
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value of k. In the end, the new data point is given the class of the majority of the other points in the
distance area.
kMC The k means clustering (kMC) algorithm takes the a set of already classified data points and partitions
them into “clusters” of data based on their features. The algorithm then creates a “prototype” for each
of its clusters. One way the algorithm could accomplish this task is by taking an average of the data
points already in the cluster. These prototypes are used to classify a new data point introduced to
the model. The prototype that most closely resembles the new point will be the cluster the point is
classified under.
SVM A support vector machine (SVM) will classify data by constructing a high-dimensional space which
separates the data points it is given. We can think of a support vector machine as a way of separating
data that is very close to each other, however, instead of attempting to make a one-dimensional cut, a
straight line, in the data a SVM will make a multi-dimensional cut, for example a hyperplane.
ELM An extreme learning machine (ELM) uses a single hidden-layer neural-network implementation to
randomly choose its hidden nodes and determine the weights of its output layer in the neural-
network. This algorithm performs very fast when learning is performed with new set of data.
GA Genetic algorithms (GA) are a type of heuristic search that attempts to mimic the process of natural
selection. The heuristic is generally interested in generating the optimal solution to the given problem.
The algorithm accomplishes this optimization by taking an initial population of data, mutating and
creating new data to add to the population. In the end, those left in the population are the optimal
solutions to the problem given to the genetic algorithm.
Next, we review the results of other researchers and how we will evaluate future performance. The
evaluation outlined in this section was performed by other researchers as outlined in Table 1. The primary
way these people examined their results was through looking at ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic)
curves within the literature, and will be what we present here. A ROC curve is a graph of the accuracy of
a method plotted against its false positive rate, see Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 below for some examples. When
reading the graphs we are looking at what happens when the accuracy rates go up. If the false positive rate
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increases uniformly with the accuracy we know we have a poor classifier. On the other hand, if the false
positive rate were to increase at a much slower rate than the accuracy then we would have an acceptable
classifier.
The second section will cover k nearest neighbor (kNN), the third covers k means clustering (kMC), the
next section will be about using support vector machines (SVM) and the last section will use a semantic
approach with an Extreme Learning Machine (ELM). The results of these methods can be seen in Table 1.
These four methods were published within three papers. In the first paper, M. Xie et. al. [9] were inter-
ested in seeing how changing the way the distance was calculated affected classifications which involved
distance. More specifically, they were trying to minimize the frequency vectors used during classification.
Frequency vectors are vectors where each position is a weighted average of how often that system call
would appear in any given sequence for each possible system call. Hence, these vectors are of length 324,
because there are that many possible system calls in the data see Table 2, with each slot being the frequency
of that system call appearing divided by the total number of system calls in that sequence. They then chose
to pick two of the most common frequency-based algorithms in which they could vary how distance was
calculated: kNN and kMC. The second paper M. Xie et. al. [11], attemps to use the data in a non-frequency
based approach. They make this decision because they believed that their results from the kNN and kMC
techniques to have poor performance. Instead, they use a one-class SVM and short sequences (shortened
frequency vectors) from the dataset to classify anomalies. The third paper, using a semantic approach to
classifying anomalies using multiple dictionaries as inputs to an ELM and SVM. This technique showed
amazing results for this dataset but it came with a computational heavy cost. As mentioned before, the
kNN and kMC experiments use many different types of distance metrics depending on which algorithm
was being used. For kNN Euclidean, standarized Euclidean, Minkowski, Cosine and Mahalanobis space
were used. While kMC used Euclidean, Minkowski, Cosine and Correlation space.
In addition to techniques analyzing system call traces we will look at some work not involving this
approach. One such technique involves network based intrusion detection.[14] This system monitors and
analyzes network traffic to protect a machine from network-based attacks. It will attempt to detect mali-
cious actions such as a denial-of-service attack or port scans. The network based intrusion detection system
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scans network traffic packets close to real time in order to detect abnormal behavior. Moreover, we will
examine how some researchers have been using genetic algorithms techniques to create an network-based
intrusion detection system.
2.2 Network Intrusion Detection
There is a large amount of data a network intrusion detection system must process in order to run efficiently.
These types of systems became an emerging topic of research during the expansion of the internet across
the world. At that time research with host based systems was prevalent. One approach that came about
was the State Transition Analysis Technique (STAT) and it was applied to network intrusion detection.
The NetSTAT [15] modeled network attacks as state transition diagrams, where states and transitions are
characterized in a network environment. The network environment itself was modeled with graphs that
have multiple edges connecting many nodes together. However, the NetSTAT tool was only developed to
allow users to analyze their networks instead of a full intrusion detection system.
Another more successful approach to network intrusion detection involves the use of genetic algo-
rithms. This model [16] was divided into two phases: precalculation and detection. During the precalcula-
tion phase the model would analyze an initial random population and as it traversed through the network
training data. If the model found some part of the population to be close to the new data, the model would
merge with the new data and create a new population. Otherwise, an entirely new population is created
with the training data without merging with parts of the initial random population. During detection their
genetic algorithm would run and attempt to optimize the fitness level in the population to detect abnormal
behavior. In other words, the model was identifying which parts of the population are normal with a high
fitness level, and whenever some data that has low fitness appears it was detected as abnormal behavior.
With this model the researchers were able to have a detection rate of about 95% and a false positive rate of
around 30%.
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2.3 kNN
The k nearest neighbor algorithm is the most used algorithm within the area of anomaly detection. [9]
However, when used to detect anomalies among the system call traces it failed to effectively detect attacks
even when the system call trace inputs were much shorter in length. Looking at Figure 1 we can see that
just using Euclidean space for each attack high/low accuracy was followed by high/low false positives.
Within the scope of a problem that only has two classes this would seem to mean that kNN is no better than
merely guessing.
The evaluation of the algorithm was done by comparing how well the algorithm classified each at-
tack separately. Because of the poor performance of the kNN algorithm not much is discussed in terms of
evaluation purposes. Instead the paper turns its attention towards the kMC algorithm because it is com-
putationally less expensive than kNN and has a much better anomaly detection rate using certain distance
metrics. We can deduce from the performance of kNN that this dataset is not as frequency dependent as it
may seem. Let us examine the results of the popular clustering algorithm kMC.
Figure 1: kNN using Euclidean Space Accuracy against False Positve Rate[9]
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2.4 kMC
Classifying most of the attacks with the kMC algorithm achieved an accuracy of 60% or higher with a false
positive rate of around 20%. Of all of the attack types, seen in Figure 2, the Java Meterpreter was the easiest
to detect while the Hydra-FTP and Hydra-SSH can not effectively be detected using these frequency-based
approaches. In terms of a distance metric the best performing metric evaluated was the cosine distance, in
Figure 2 we can see the accuracy plotted against the false positive rate for the kMC algorithm.
Figure 2: kMC using Cosine Space Accuracy against False Positve Rate[9]
2.5 SVM
We have two separate SVM approaches using the system call traces to classify anomalies. Thus, we will
separate this section into two subsections one using short sequences the other using the dictionaries.
2.5.1 Dictionary Method
We will first examine the dictionary method of setting up the data for use inside of an SVM. Creech et. al. [8]
created multiple dictionaries which contained all the possible combinations of sequences from the normal
and attack dataset. Essentially, they created an algorithm which read through the dataset in multiple passes
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and created “rulesets” for which sequences are normal and which are abnormal for all the sequences in the
dataset. These rulesets contain all possible combinations of the attack and normal sequences as a look-
up table. The algorithm created a dictionary for each system call number in the dataset. The dictionary
corresponded to one system call and the entries to the dictionary were other system calls and the type of
behavior that this sequence was classified under. It was from these many dictionaries that the “rules” for
which particular sequences were attack or normal was generated. The “rulesets“ were the sets of the rules
from analyzing the dictionaries that would classify the sequence as attack or normal. This process took over
a week to complete, however they were able to achieve an accuracy of around 80% with a false positive rate
of 15%, seen in Figure 3. But because of the significant computations needed to create the dictionaries other
methods were sought out.
Figure 3: SVM and ELM using the Dictionary Method[8]
2.5.2 Short Sequences
The short sequence approach attempts to address the issue of computation cost and time. Short sequences
are similar to frequency vectors except they only look at the most frequent sequences making them shorter
on average. For example, imagine a dataset primarily containing the frequently occurring sequences “A A
B”, “B B A” and other very infrequently occurring sequences. However, lets say that we have determined
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that these two primary sequences makeup over say 90% of the data, we would disregard the other infre-
quently occurring sequences when making our frequency vectors and only examine these most frequent
sequences. How short is dependent upon the frequency of the sequence occurring in the dataset.
As a result, this method can be produced much faster, and yielded results comparable to the dictionary
method. An accuracy of around 70% was achieved with a false positive rate of 20%, seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: SVM using the Short Sequences[11]
2.6 ELM
An Extreme Learning Machine was used with the dictionary method as a form of input as described previ-
ously. What makes the result from these experiments remarkable is that it is substantially higher than most
of what has been done with system call traces before. This result shows that this dataset does contain the
necessary information to learn how to detect anomalies from. However, as described before, the practical
use of this technique is moot because of the computational cost of creating the dictionaries. For example, by
the time the dictionaries have been created the normal behavior of the system may have changed making
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the dictionaries useless. The results of the ELM can be seen in Figure 3 with an accuracy of around 90% and
a false positive rate of around 15%.
2.7 Previous Conclusions
First, we see how one group of researchers created a means of analyzing a network in order to attempt to
detect intrusion. Although the project was never turned into a full-fledged intrusion detection system, they
demonstrate the value of network-based intrusion detection. Next,we see a different approach to intrusion
detection by M. Hoque et. al. [16] using network based techniques rather than system call traces. The results
that are seen are considered to be sufficient detection rates in the field. However, they do suffer at the cost
of a large false positive rate. Nevertheless, their work demonstrates the power that genetic algorithms can
lend to the intrusion detection problem.
M. Xie et. al. [9] concluded that kNN is ineffective against detecting attacks, while kMC can detect most
attacks. The paper also spoke of needing to understand the characteristics of attacks that make up system
call traces in order to create more effective ways of formatting the data for detection. These conclusions
are very straight forward and can be observed in Figure 1 and 2. The kNN algorithm is only as good as
guessing while kMC shows some promise of being able to learn what the attacks are by clustering.
M. Xie et. al. [11] also found that short sequences are able to show separability between normal and
attack sequences, while maintaining computational costs low. This technique can be implemented in a
much shorter time as compared with the dictionary SVM methods described previously. However, the
weighting of the short sequences still is not optimal. Here, the conclusions made seem to hold the most
promising results for future work. Going forward, if a way of creating more distinct short sequences can be
made then anomalies can be more easily distinguished by the SVM.
Finally, G. Creech and J. Hu [8] demonstrated the power of semantic analysis when using a system call
traces. The results seen are really substantial however they practically do not hold value because of the
overhead required computationally. Although, this doesn’t rule out the value of a semantic approach. If a
method can be found that will substantially decrease the input needed for the ELM then they can be used
practically.
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Number Name
0 sys restart syscall
1 sys exit
2 sys fork
... ...
265 sys clock gettime
... ...
322 sys timerfd create
... ...
324 sys fallocate
Table 2: Part of a System Call Table for Linux 2.6.38
In the next section we will discuss the methods that we used and how we went about designing the
classification experiments.
3 Methods and Design
Now that we have an understanding of the problem and what has been attempted so far we can begin to
outline the work we have done.
Our work is based on the work of M. Xie et. al. [11] Recall that M. Xie et. al. found short sequences of the
larger system call sequences show separability between which are normal versus attack. We are then going
to analyze the data using some idea of sub-sequences. N grams have been used as models to understand
sequence data [12] as well as in predicting a sequence of events [13]. An n gram is a short arbitrary length,
denoted by the n, subsequence of a larger sequence. In this context, we took subsequences of the system
call traces of some length. We have created a system that generated these n grams and we have analyzed
them with certain classification algorithms.
Next, we will briefly explain the dataset we are using throughout our experiments and model building.
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Name Method
Brute force Password FTP by Hydra
Brute force Password SSH by Hydra
Add new superuser Client side malicious executable
Java Based Meterpreter TikiWiki vulnerability
Linux Meterpreter Payload Client side malicious executable
C100 Webshell PHP Remote file Inclusion Vulnerability
Table 3: Attacks on the System
Group Number of Traces
Normal Data 833
Validation Data 4373
Hydra-FTP 162
Hydra-SSH 148
Adduser 91
Java-Meterpreter 125
Meterpreter 75
Webshell 118
Table 4: ADFA-LD Structure
3.1 Processing the Data
3.1.1 Overview of the ADFA-LD
This dataset was generated by Creech et. al. to be used when designing and evaluating anomaly based
intrusion detection systems using system calls. Our approach involves the use of this dataset, but before
we begin to examine the dataset we will give a short introduction into the type of data that it contains:
system call sequences. As presented previously, a host-based intrusion detection system examines local
information on the system. System calls are a fundamental interface between a program on a machine
and the operating system. The effective use of system calls within host-based anomaly detection was first
proposed by Forrest et. al. [2] The major two advantages found were:
(i) System calls are more dangerous than a typical user process because a system call will have greater
access to the system’s resources
(ii) An operating system will have a finite list of operations, which creates predictable system call se-
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quences under normal system operations
This last point is especially useful within the scope of anomaly detection, because it allows us to generate a
predictive model which we can use to check for abnormal deviations on the system, and because its a finite
list, in a reasonable amount of time. The ADFA-LD contains these system call “traces” of a server under
normal operation and while it is being attacked. We can analyze these traces and look for ways to be able
to classify what an attack versus normal operation is.
The ADFA-LD is a collection of system call traces. A single trace is a sequence of system call numbers,
see Table 2, over some arbitrary time period. Each trace is discontinuous from the other traces and may
contain more or fewer system calls. The traces were collected using the Linux audit daemon Auditd [3] on
Ubuntu Linux 11.04. To allow for certain attacks to take place, Apache Version 2.2.17 running PHP version
5.3.5 were installed and enabled. The operating system was full patched and FTP, SSH, and MySQL 14.14
were running on their default port settings. TikiWiki 8.1 was installed because it was known to have a
vulnerability to allow for a certain attack on the system. [6] This system configuration represents a modern
Linux server with some small vulnerabilities build in place.
The attacks the system were placed under were carefully chosen to use methods that a modern-day
hacker or penetration tester would have access to. In Table 3, we can see the breakdown for the different
types of attacks in the dataset as well as the methods used to implement them. The small vulnerabilities
were purposefully engineered into the system to be able to collect the data appropriately. Overly exploitable
servers are rare and the use of such a server would be without purpose for the scope of the problems this
dataset aims to address.
The first two attacks represent a brute force password guessing attempt on the open FTP and SSH ser-
vices. This attack is often a last resort of most attackers due to its large potential to be caught out on my
intrusion detection systems. For the next attack, an executable was made that would create a new user
with root privileges. The executable was uploaded onto the server and was triggered remotely using social
engineering. The next two attacks involve Meterpreter, this program is a command shell with enhanced
functionality. The TikiWiki vulnerability allows to unknowingly upload a copy of the Java Meterpreter.
Once the program was uploaded it would initiate a reverse TCP connection to attack the system. Once the
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command shell was installed it could have greater access to changing the configuration of the system, es-
calating privileges or attempting to access the shadow password file. The Linux Meterpreter was uploaded
using social engineering and behaves similarly to the Java Meterpreter. The difference between the two
is only the implementation of the program itself, which could lead to different system call traces. Lastly,
the C100 Webshell is a sophisticated piece of PHP which allows shell access to the attack through a web
browser.
This set of attacks represents what an average attacker may use in an attempt to take advantage of a
system and compromise it. The set ranges from low level, high profile brute force attempts to vulnerabilities
within services running on the machine. The use of these attacks will yield traces that use modern hacking
methods. [7]
Now that we have an understanding of the attacks being used within the dataset let us go into some
more detail on its contents. The ADFA-LD is publicly available and contains virtually no mark-up or for-
matting of any kind. The reason for this is so that future researchers can manipulate the data from its
purest form: the system call traces. Again, a system call trace is simply a sequence of system call numbers
dictating some sequence of events happening on the machine. The data was designed or anomaly-based
intrusion detection systems, not signature-based recognition. [8] It is organized into three separate groups
each containing the pure system calls. The groups are: normal, attack (which contains separate attack traces
groups) and validation data, see Table 4.
The traces were collected while the system was either being attacked or under normal operations. Both
the normal and validation groups contain traces for normal operations of the system, while the attack set
naturally contains attack traces. The data can be used to answer the simple question: is there an attack
occurring on the system? This can be answered by classifying the traces as either normal or abnormal
behavior for a given system. Since there are only 324 possible system calls within a single trace, due to
the operating system, we can view them as being the attributes of the raw dataset. Additionally, because
the data is used to classify anomalies we have two classes: anomaly or not. As a result of being used for
anomaly detection, the effectiveness of classifying the anomalies is entirely dependent upon manipulating
the system call traces appropriately.
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3.1.2 N gram Approach
The data, as described before, is divided into three major categories: normal, attack, and validation. First
we preprocessed the data so that each major category is broken down into ten separate bins. By doing this
preprocessing, we have thirty data files to work with, ten for each category. We performed this prepro-
cessing so that we can run a ten-fold cross validation on the data. The attack data is broken down into its
individual attack types as outlined in Table 3 and seen in the dataset structure in Table 4. We are concerning
ourselves with only learning to divide the data into two classes: attack or normal.
Once we completed this process we then started to create subsequences for each of the bins. In order to
do this we first took some sequence from the dataset. Next, we broke down this sequence into a series of
subsequences that we used as the series of observations of the sequence from the dataset. These observa-
tions are what we used to learn and predict the behavior of a sequence. Remember, we want to determine
if the data represents attack or normal behavior. The size of the subsequence is denoted by the value n.
When we broke down the sequence into its subsequences we wanted to make all of the subsequences the
same size. For example, with four grams, we would take all of our sequences from the dataset and break
them up into subsequences of length four. At the end of the generation of the n grams we had the thirty
data files, described previously, to work with. Each of these files was a list of the separated sequences
transformed into n grams. Using ten-fold cross validation, we trained a classifier on part of the data and
tested the classifier on another. Because n grams separate the sequences out into shorter subsequences we
needed a way to classify the sequence as a whole. We then analyzed the subsequences of a sequence.The
sequence were called normal if 90% of its subsequences are normal; otherwise, it was classified as an attack.
Afterwards, we compared to the true class, the ground truth, of that specific sequence. In the end, we had
a classification of the n grams.
3.2 Reducing the Attributes
After gathered the results from just classifying the data we began to eliminate dimensionality of the prob-
lem. There are 324 possible attributes in any given sequence. The issue is that it is difficult to be able to
quantify what constitutes an attack versus a normal sequence. The approach we used to reduce the num-
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ber of attributes in a sequence is to collapse down a subset of the attributes into one attribute. Removing
attributes from the dataset appears to be counter-intuitive because our goal was to learn what attacks and
normal behavior look like. Taking away information would seem to be taking away information we can
learn from. However, we must consider that much of what happens on a system is typically going to be
normal behavior of either the user or just the system alone. One can imagine that when attacks occur on
modern systems they are generally marked by a small period of operation because they want to be stealthy
to avoid detection. As a result, when we take a trace of system calls much of what we learned from will be
normal behavior. So in an effort to narrow down what we learned we want to reduce some of the attributes
that are not occurring very often during attacks versus normal behavior. Additionally, we performed this
collapsing in order to avoid overfitting the data. We wanted to make sure that we are not analyzing the
data by considering all possible system call sequences. Instead, by collapsing some of them down into
one system call we were able to focus the model on the important system call sequences. This process
avoided overfitting because we did not learn precisely every sequence, instead we chose to ignore some of
the system calls.
In order to determine what we wanted to collapse down we began by analyzing the percent frequency
of the data. In other words, we wanted to find out which system call attributes are appearing the least and
in what part of the data. From that point we began to choose out the ones that may benefit from being
reduced and analyze the results. We have found that by collapsing the infrequently occurring parts of the
data the model can focus on the more important frequently occurring data.
The next section will discuss and evaluate some of the early results that we saw during the beginning
of our research with the methods outlined above.
4 Early Results
Shown in Table 5 we have the results of using our method with the k nearest neighbor and support vector
machine classifiers. The implementation of our experiments was written in Python [4] using the scikit-learn
package [5].
The results we saw, in the early stages experimentation, by analyzing various subsets of the data showed
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Classifier Classification Accuracy
k nearest neighbor 34%
support vector machine 64%
Table 5: Early Results
promising results. Referencing Table 1 as a guide for success we can begin to understand the early results
gathered from our own experiments.
4.1 SVM
The support vector machine outperformed the other classifier as well as having been the closest to prior
results using the same classifier. Support vector machines do not depend on the dimensionality of the
problem. Our classification without reducing the attributes has many features under consideration during
classification. However, a support vector machine is not limited computationally by this aspect. Addi-
tionally, when we have a result from a support vector machine we can feel confident in the model’s future
predictions. The reason for this is because support vector machines do well to not over-fit themselves when
they are fitted to some data. Going forward, we aimed to use this classifier to generate even better results
because of these features of the classifier.
4.2 kNN
Not much optimization of the k nearest neighbor classifier was performed. However, we performed experi-
ments with this classifier to compared our method against prior results. We have ran a basic implementation
of the classifier and have received the poor results seen in Table 5. These results are not close in relation to
the literature’s success with this algorithm. A k nearest neighbor classifier is used because of its simplicity
in design and quick computational benefits. Generally, we can use this type of classifier as a base-line of
performance and we will do precisely that. Some further optimization of this classifier is required to be
able to set up a confident enough baseline of results. Having seen the excellent comparative performance
of the support vector machine we have focused our future experiments using the SVM.
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4.3 Early Results Discussion
We have set up a proof of concept for the method outlined previously as demonstrated by our results
with the support vector machine classifier. These preliminary tests will be improved on going forward
as we optimize the classifiers. We have shown that using n-grams as a means of classification does not
degrade performance when compared to other results using the same classifier. The support vector machine
has demonstrated superior performance as opposed to the k-nearest neighbor approach. Therefore, going
forward we will use the support vector machine when analyzing the results from reducing the system
calls. Recall, that we are going to reduce the system call traces based on the frequency a system call is
used throughout the data set. In the next section, we will examine the results of using the support vector
machine along with the reduction of the attributes described previously.
5 Reduction Results
5.1 Analyzing a small subset of the data
Figure 5: ROC curve for compressed traces (subset)
Within this section we outline the results of applying the reduction scheme to the data described pre-
viously. In essence, we wanted to see if by performing this reduction on the system call traces we could
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Figure 6: ROC curve for uncompressed traces (subset)
increase the performance of the support vector machine classifier. To accomplish this we analyzed receiver
operating characteristic curves for both the compressed and uncompressed versions of the classifier.
Looking at Figure 5 and Figure 6 we can see a clear difference between the compressed and uncom-
pressed classifiers. In the compressed ROC curve we have a larger area under the curve, 0.98, while the
uncompressed version has the a smaller arena under the curve, 0.96. However, just by looking at these
graphs is not enough to distinguish between the two classifiers. It could be the case that these two classi-
fiers are the predicting the same results and there is just small enough of a variation between the results
that yields the different ROC curves. To test for statistical significance of the models we performed a sign
test on the classification results of these two models. We received a probability value of 0.0206 which is low
enough to indicate that these two models are statistically different from each other. In other words, this
result means that our compression hypothesis appears to be true. We can increase classification results by
analyzing compressed versions of the system call traces. What remains to be seen is if this result will hold
true by analyzing larger amounts of data.
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5.2 Using all of the data
We analyze the results of using all of the data in combination with the reduction scheme outlined before.
Remember, we wanted to identify if performing this reduction on the system call traces will increase the
performance of our support vector machine classifier. As we did in earlier sections, we accomplished this
analysis by looking at receiving operating characteristic curves for compressed and uncompressed versions
of the classifier.
Comparing Figure 7 and Figure 8 we can immediately see that there appeared to be a difference between
the two versions of the classifiers. The compressed ROC curve has a larger area under the curve, 0.99, than
the uncompressed model, 0.95. As we did when we performed the analysis of the model with a small subset
of the data we performed a sign test on the classifiers in order to detect statistical significance. However,
the sign test did not detect a statistical difference between the two models. Additionally, the classification
accuracy of the models were not different either, both the uncompressed and compressed versions reached
around a 60% classification accuracy. We can not conclude whether these two models are not statistically
different from each other. These results indicated that we our hypothesis can not be conclusively proven
false. It appeared that with large amounts of data it was more difficult to differentiate between models.
In other words, our results showed inconclusive evidence that the two models are different. However,
statistically this result also told us that we can not prove that they two models are the same either.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
We have seen that as a result of reducing some of the system calls down into one attribute we can increase
the performance of our support vector machine classifier up to a point. This result leads us to conclude
that our initial hypothesis was partially correct. When using a small amount of data, we can increase
classification by using this reduction scheme on the system call traces. Additionally, as previously noted,
the n-gram approach to representing the system call trace data set does not degrade performance of the
classifiers. Using the frequency based reduction approach we can see a statistically significant improvement
in the classifiers when analyzing the model on a small amount of data.
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Figure 7: ROC curve for compressed traces (full)
Figure 8: ROC curve for uncompressed traces (full)
The reduction scheme does not conclusively improve the performance of the classifier when the model
has access to more data to learn from. A possible reason for this result may be due to how we implemented
the reduction. We kept the frequency threshold during reduction the same in both experiments. However,
one possible explanation is that because we increase the amount of data we needed to adjust the reduction
threshold as well. Otherwise, we may not be taking into account enough of the attributes during the reduc-
tion step of preprocessing. In the future we need to evaluate the reduction algorithm in order to see if we
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can come up with statistically different models.
For future work on this project we would like to implement an intrusion detection system which uses
this compression technique along with the n-gram system call analysis. This project would require manip-
ulation of an operating system’s kernel code in order to be able to audit the machine properly to receive
the system call traces. From there the model would be put into place as a monitoring system that will keep
track of some number of the system call traces within some windowed time period. In order for the system
to be able to run in real time it would need to be able to efficiently break up the windowed sequence into
the n-grams and perform the classification analysis on them. After this system is implemented in a live
operating system we could validate the results given here. Additionally, we would be able to understand
the limits of such a system, for example how do we trick it into thinking an attack is normal behavior, and
make improvements to our original classification model. 1
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